Unfortunately though, the Plame affair was far from a fictitious paranoia ridden screenplay; and as history trudges on it will forever be a shadow looming over the patrimony of the Bush administration and the damaging ramifications it placed on the collective perception of the Central brain Agency. Published in 2007, Plame's autobiography, Fair Game, provides understanding into events surrounding her outing as an undercover Cia agent, its impact, and the twenty years of aid she devoted to the Cia. This recapitulate will begin with a brief synopsis of Fair Game, discuss the unfolding of events that led to Plame's outing, and highlight some of the issues within the Central brain department as pointed out by Plame throughout her twenty year career.
Published in October 2007, Fair Game is an account of Valerie Plame's twenty year tenure at the Central brain department and the events that led up to and followed the leak of her name by Washington Post reporter Robert Novak in July 2003. As an employee of the Cia, before Plame could issue her book, she had to submit all her writings to the Cia Publications recapitulate Board (Prb), to make sure she was not releasing any classified information. There are vital portions of Fair Game blacked out that the Cia redacted but as the reader finds out later on towards the end of the book, much of that facts had already been declassified and was in the collective sphere. Since, much of the blacked out portions of the book were already declassified, there is an afterword by Laura Rozen that fills in the missing pieces of information.
MISSIONS TRIPS TO AFRICA
When Valerie Plame first joined the department in 1985, under Cia director William Casey, it 'was in the midst of rapid increase and thoughprovoking transformation'. Casey, who, 'to this day many in the department think the best director the department has ever had', began the work student program, an elite program into which Plame was accepted. The program was a true training program that coupled intense schoraly teachings of the Agency's ways, government and political systems, and vigorous corporeal training at the "Farm". In the first chapter, Plame begins with her perceive at the "Farm", which included paramilitary-style operational training and corps- building. With such exercises as trudging through woods and swamps carrying eighty pound book bags at 4 a.m., jumping out of helicopters, evading potential captors, and simulated situations of being captured and held captive, it is definite the Cia went to great lengths in training their recruits and sifting out the weaklings. After successfully graduating from the student program, Plame got her first assignment as a Cia case officer in Athens, Greece in 1989. Having had official cover while in Greece, she worked by day as a junior political officer at the U.S. Embassy.
It was while the after-hours where Plame carried out her work as a covert operations officer. While in Greece, she was assigned to the internal political developments, and much of her work focused on the Marxist terrorist group 17 November (N17), which had been responsible for over 100 attacks and 23 assassinations, one which included the Athens Cia center Chief Richard Welch in 1975. As an operations officer, it was Plame's duty to seek out potential recruits, organize connections, verbalize relations, and resolve either or not they would be a vital source of facts for the Agency. Essentially, she spent her years in Greece recruiting spies that could provide vital inside facts on N17. By 1992, Plame returned back to Washington after the N17 had been taken down by local Greek authorities. In the middle of the years of 1992 and 1996, Plame worked as a Nonofficial Covered Officer (Noc) in Brussels. Plame spent only a year as a Noc, because the prior years were devoted to schoraly training to distance herself from the U.S. Government. By 1997, she was called back to headquarters to work in the newly created Couterproliferation department (Cpd) in the Directorate of Operations (Do). It was also that year, that Plame would meet hereafter husband, former U.S. Ambassador to Gabon, Joseph C. Wilson Iv. By 1998, the combine married and placed in Washington, D.C.
The Cpd that Plame joined in 1998 was 'devoted to obtaining brain and thwarting nuclear acquisitions efforts of rogue nations and nonstate actors'. One of the main objectives and most successes of the Cpd while this time was the take down of A.Q. Khan in 2003. Khan, a Pakistani, had over the years set up a large nuclear black shop network. After giving birth to her twins, Plame took a year off work before returning to the department full time in April 2001. Upon her return, 'Valerie Wilson was one of two Cia operations officers assigned to work in the Iraq field of the Cpd'. After the events of September 11th occurred, it was not long before the war drums began gently beating in the distance. It was also while this time that the trickle of politics began to gently seep into the agency. Agreeing to Plame, the department began the investigation into the yellowcake uranium from Niger shortly after an officer came to her office saying that she had just gotten off the phone with a staffer from the office of the Vice President. The officer had spoken with the staffer after they had received an brain record passed on from the Italian government.
The record "alleged in 1999 Iraq had sought yellowcake uranium. .. From Niger'. The staffer told the officer that the Vice President wanted more facts on the claim. When this officer came to Plame, saying that she had just received a phone call from a staffer working in the Vice President's office she was momentarily perplexed. As Plame noted, 'in my experience, I had never known that to happen. There were exact protocols and procedures for funneling brain to policy makers or fielding their questions'. Plame brushed it aside and went to work,' unaware of the unprecedented whole of visits the vice president had made to Headquarters to meet with analysts and look for an available evidence to preserve the Iraq Wmd claims the administration was beginning to make'. Working with fellow employees on how to best research the Niger claims, Plame and her colleagues worked diligently trying to come up with the best options.
It was while this time that Plame's husband, Joseph Wilson, was brought up as man who could help the department in investigating the Niger claims. Despite later reports, it was not Plame herself who had recommended Joe for the mission but a midlevel reports officer,' who knew of Joe's history and role in the first Gulf War, his allinclusive perceive in Africa, and also that in 1999 the Cia had sent Joe on a sensitive mission to Africa on uranium issues'. At the time, Plame embraced the idea, unaware of the damaging events and controversy that would ensue. Plame and the reports officer met with their boss to discuss the proposition. Embracing the idea, their boss, 'suggested putting together a meeting with Joe and the appropriate department and State officers'. A week later, Wilson met with 'Iraq/Niger experts from Cpd, the Di, and State', and three weeks later in early March of 2002, he began his fact seeing mission in Niger. Upon his return nine days later, two 'Cia officers, one of whom was the Reports Officer who had recommend [Wilson]', came to the Wilson's household to debrief Wilson on his trip so they could immediately write up an brain report. As the collective now knows, Wilson found no evidence that supported claims that Iraq had sought yellowcake uranium from Niger. Yet despite the refuting claims, the administration still seemed convinced that Iraq was in proprietary of Wmd and posed a serious threat to the nation's security.
Furthermore, in his 2003 January State of the Union speech, President Bush stated 'the British government has learned that Sadam Hussein recently sought vital quantities of uranium from Africa'. The war drums prolonged to beat on, getting louder with the passing months, and by March 2003, the invasion of Iraq had begun. Needless to say, the Wilson's were bewildered. Both Plame and Wilson had and knew of evidence that refuted much of what the Bush administration had been feeding to the public, especially the claim that Iraq had been seeking uranium from Niger. These sixteen words that showed up in the President's speech would be a major source of contention in the following months. How that claim made its way into a presidential speech to the public, was not only bewildering to the Wilson's but to many others in the Cia. As the war lingered on, and Wmds continuously failed to show up, Wilson was prompted to write an record about his trip to Niger. The July 6 New York Times op-ed, titled "What I Did Not Find in Africa", set in request for retrial the firestorm that would soon become the Plame Affair. On July 14, weeks after Wilson's record appeared in the New York Times, The Washington Post ran an record by journalist Robert Novak that claimed, 'Wilson never worked for the Cia, but his wife Valerie Plame, is an department operative on weapons of mass destruction.' After Plame's identity as a Cia agent was released, the backlash began. Accusations of nepotism against Plame were copiously thrown around. Wilson was accused of biased and sloppy reporting about his trip to Niger. The toll that the controversy had on the combine was tremendous. The affair would drag on for four tumultuous years, finally ending in the indictment of I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, who had leaked Plame's name to Robert Novak.
Fair Game highlights one of the many issues the brain community has had to continuously tackle. That issue, politicized intelligence, is one that has been as onerous as it has been persistent; and as revealed throughout Fair Game, how unmistakably politicized brain can shape even the direst of policy decisions. an additional one issue, as pointed out by Plame, which the Cia dealt with while this period, was the deep seated disagreements that existed amongst the Cia and other brain Agencies. Though genuine disagreements amongst the assorted brain agencies are common, in the case of the Iraq War and Wmds, the failure to transport the severity of the disagreements that existed failed to make its way to policy makers. Though Plame cites many of the obstacles the department faced, she doesn't propose any remedies to alleviate or fix the cited issues.
Of the many issues the brain community has had to continuously tackle, since the inception of the Ic with the 1947 National safety Act, politicized brain has long been a thorn in the side of the Ic. Politicized brain can occur in assorted forms, from policy makers telling analysts what outcomes should be in their done products, to analysts feeling pressured to give policy makers what they want to hear, and analysts trying to shape outcomes themselves. Though analysts are trained to and take extra precaution to avoid politicization of intelligence, it can sometimes be so subtle that it slips under the radar. In the case of the lead up to the Iraq War, it was clear that politicization had made its way into the Cia. As early as 2002, as later reports would reveal, Vice President Cheney and his senior aide, I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby, made an unprecedented whole of visits to Cia headquarters.
Speaking with department analysts that were working on the Iraq Wmd issues, they would often ask questions about Iraq and potential links to Al-Qaeda. Though these multiple visits by the pair weren't publicly known until June 2003, senior brain officials were quoted as saying that these visits by Cheney 'had created and environment in which some analysts felt they were being pressured to make their assessments fit with the Bush Administration's policy objectives.. .while visits to Cia Headquarters are not unprecedented, they are unusual'. Supplementary evidence of the creeping politicization of brain prolonged to occur as the country moved closer to war. The sixteen words previously mentioned about Iraq obtaining uranium in Bush's state of the union speech and how it made its way into his speech befuddled many department employees. Despite firm warnings to the White House from the Cia and then Dci George Tenet, against citing the Iraq-Niger claims, those infamous sixteen words somehow managed to find its way into the 2003 State of the Union address. Agreeing to Rozen, 'National safety Council Official, Robert Joseph, would go nearby Tenent to find a Cia department head, Winpac chief Alan Foley, willing to sign off on the president citing the Niger claim'.
As it became increasingly clear that the nation was headed for war, a sense of polarization within the Cia was also mounting. When Plame joined the agency, there was never mention of political affiliation, but 'with the passage of time, politics began to creep into the environment and one tended to have a general idea of where one's colleagues stood on the Bush administration'. As polarization and politicization began to gently seep into the Agency, it wasn't until 2004 when the Cia had truly felt the flood of politicization. The 2004 resignations of Director of Central brain (Dci) George Tenet and Deputy Director of Operations (Ddo) Jim Pavitt, shocked many department employees. Though the pair cited a desire to spend more time with their families as the thinking for leaving, employees knew there was more to it than that. By September, Bush appointed Porter Goss as the new Dci. Goss, from the beginning was bitterly resented by many department employees.
He was criticized for not interacting with senior department managers, for spending little time with the heads of foreign brain services (all of whom the Cia relied on for cooperation in counter terrorism and counter proliferation matters); for not being sufficiently engaged in day-to-day activities, and for being unable to devotee some of the details of operations.
Furthermore, after a memo Goss emailed to all Cia employees after the 2004 presidential election, fears of the creeping politicization of the department were fully realized. As Plame notes, the memo read as follows, 'We preserve the administration, and its policies, in our work as department employees... We do not identify with, support, or champion opposition to the administration or its policies. We provide the brain as we see it-and let the facts alone speak to the policy maker'. Though it is clear there was a degree of politicization within the department while this time, politicization has been a long standing issue. Clearly, with the case of the Iraq War, politicization played a major role. In the past, politicization has all the time played a part within the brain community, but because it has tended to come in more subtle forms it is an issue that is often overlooked. Because analysts are trained to detect and avoid politicized intelligence, and the repercussions are severe, the only definite remedies seem to be to have more arduous training of analysts and employees of the Ic on politicization. an additional one potential remedy is in the choice of Dci; the negative impact Porter Goss had on the Cia was considerable.
As Plame notes, ' by January 2005, over twenty senior Cia officials had retired or resigned since Goss became Dci...one thousand years of hard-earned operational perceive walked.. .when our country's national safety needs were greatest'. In an department as vital as the Cia, a good leader that unites rather than divides is imperative. Furthermore, the role of the Dci should not be attenuated to serving as a puppet to the President's administration.
Another issue the brain community constantly must deal with is the disagreements among the assorted agencies on intelligence. One divergence in singular that erupted In the middle of the department of vigor and the Cia was over the purpose of the aluminum tubes ordered by Iraq in 2001. The vigor Department's stance was that the tubes were used for rocket casings, while one department interpreter believed the tubes were used for centrifuge rotors used to separate isotopes to enrich uranium. Agreeing to Plame, 'the crime and sizable failure of the brain community-and the Cia in particular- was that these deep disagreements were relegated to footnotes in tiny type at the bottom of the National brain estimation (Nie)'. Furthermore, the "Presidents Summary", a one page memo, warned the President that there were serious doubts about the intended use of the aluminum tubes. Despite the warnings and doubts expressed by the agency, 'that inconvenient fact did not fit well into their war planning'.
Whether or not, the administration would have heeded the warnings of the Cia had they been clearer and direct about the serious doubts that existed In the middle of the agencies is unclear but it is definite the department failed to portray the severity of the divergence and uncertainty that surrounded the use of the aluminum tubes. This instance highlights two of the obstacles faced by all the brain agencies. divergence will almost all the time exists amongst the agencies, but given the succinct nature of brain reports, many of the existing doubts are often relegated to footnotes. policy makers naturally do not have the time to read long detailed brain reports, but sometimes definite issues, such as the decision to go to war, brief reports do not seem sufficient. Although, the newly enacted brain Reform and Terrorism arresting act of 2004, has allowed for broader cooperation amongst the agencies, it is relatively early to see if these new implantations will make an impact in rectifying the issue of department cooperation and their effects on brain reports.
As man who was betrayed by, not only her country ,but the department which she devoted 20 years too, one would expect Fair Game to be a bitter ridden memoir loaded with ample finger pointing. Though, there is unmistakably a sense of hurt and betrayal on Plame's part present throughout the book, she takes great care in not portraying herself as a victim at the hands of the U.S. Government. Fair Game highlights many issues that the brain Community, and in singular the Cia, have had to continuously tackle. Though she identifies these issues, she does not offer any recommendations or revisions to rectify these problems. Overall, Fair Game provides readers with deeper understanding into the workings of the Cia and a deeper appreciation of an department that far too often falls under collective scrutiny.
Fair Game MISSIONS TRIPS TO AFRICA
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